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CONTRACTS 
Kathleen E. Paynet 
INTRODUCTION 
Of the cases decided during the survey period involving contract 
issues, five appear worthy of review. l The most noteworthy case 
was decided under the Uniform Commercial Code and involved a 
warranty disclaimer and limitation of remedy provision. The Court 
held the contract clause unconscionable under the facts of the case, 
even if the contract was treated as arising in a commercial setting. 
The opinion is significant because unconscionability is rarely found 
in a commercial contract between merchants. Contract provisions 
are more frequently found to be unconscionable where one of the 
parties to the contract is a consumer. The second case involved the 
issue of whether a promise not reflected in a written contract con-
taining an integration clause may be subject to an action for prom-
issory fraud. The outcome of the case turned on whether the 
claimed fraud permitted the plaintiff to establish the promise by 
extrinsic evidence, thereby avoiding all proscriptions of the parol 
evidence rule. 
The final three cases turned on the most litigated contract issue 
- contract interpretation. Each case involved the question of 
whether extrinsic evidence was admissible to interpret the lan-
guage of the contract. 
I. UNCONSCIONABILITY 
In Martin u. Joseph Harris CO.,2 the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals applied Michigan law in a diversity action for breach of im-
plied warranty of merchantability. The plaintiffs, Duane Martin 
and Robert Rick, were commercial farmers in Michigan, who sepa-
rately ordered cabbage seed from the defendant, Joseph Harris Co. 
t J.D., Detroit College of Law, 1977; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1981; Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Detroit College of Law. 
1. Those cases not reviewed were decided almost exclusively on the facts or on legal 
questions outside the contract arena. 
2. 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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(Harris Seed), a national producer and distributor of seed.3 The 
order form supplied by Harris Seed and used independently by the 
plaintiffs included a clause disclaiming the implied warranty of 
merchantability and limiting buyer's remedies to the purchase 
price of the seed.4 This clause is a standard clause used in the 
industry.~ 
After placing their seed orders in August of 1972, plaintiffs re-
ceived Harris Seed's 1973 Commercial Vegetable Growers Catalog. 
On the lower right-hand corner of one page the catalog stated that 
Harris Seed was no longer "hot water"6 treating cabbage seed. 
Plaintiff farmers planted their cabbage crops in the spring of 1973 
using, among other seed, that cabbage seed which had been sup-
plied by Harris Seed. In July, Harris Seed notified the farmers that 
the seed lot used to fill their orders was infected with black leg. 
Despite plaintiffs efforts to minimize the effect of the disease, la.rge 
portions of the cabbage crops were destroyed. Although their crops 
were smaller than usual, plaintiffs did make a profit equal to or 
larger than previous years.7 
In 1975, plaintiffs sued Harris Seed for negligence and breach of 
implied warranty of nierchantability in connection with the sale of 
the diseased cabbage seed. The trial court ruled that the disclaimer 
of warranty and limitation of remedy clause8 was unenforceable 
because it was unconscionable. A jury found for the defendant, 
Harris Seed, on both theories of negligence and implied warranty. 
Nonetheless, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for a judg-
3. Id. at 298. 
4. Id. at 298 n.1. The clause printed in the order form appeared as follows: 
Notice to Buyer: Joseph Harris Company, Inc. warrants that seeds and plants it 
sells conform to the label descriptions as required by Federal and State seed laws. 
IT MAKES NO OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR PURPOSE, OR OTHERWISE, AND IN 
ANY EVENT ITS LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF ANY WARRANTY OR CON-
TRACT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH SEEDS OR PLANTS IS LIMITED TO 
THE PURCHASE PRICE OF SUCH SEEDS OR PLANTS. 
Id. (This language also appeared on the seed packages and catalogs). 
5. Id. at 298. 
6. Id. Since 1947 hot water treatment was used to eradicate a fungus known as "black 
leg," which causes affected plants to rot before maturing. 
7. Id. The market price for cabbage increased significantly in 1973, in part because the 
black leg epidemic reduced the amount of available cabbage. 
8. See supra note 4. 
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ment notwithstanding the verdict on the implied warranty issue.9 
A second jurylO awarded the plaintiffs, Martin and Rick, $36,000 
and $16,000 respectively. The court of appeals affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court in all respects. 11 
In reaching its decision, the appellate court dealt accurately and 
concisely with three separate issues. First, the court examined 
whether under Michigan law warranty disclaimers which comply 
with V.C.C. section 2-316 are limited by the unconscionability pro-
vision of V.C.C. section 2-302.12 Next, the court determined 
whether under the special facts of the case the disclaimer and rem-
edy limitation clause was unconscionable under Michigan law.13 Fi-
nally, the court of appeals addressed whether the district court 
erred in setting aside the jury verdict and granting the plaintiff's 
motion for a judgment n.o.v. on the breach of warranty theory.u 
No Michigan case has resolved the question of whether a war-
ranty disclaimer which meets the requirements of V.C.C. section 2-
316 can be held unenforceable as unconscionable under V.C.C. sec-
tion 2-302.111 "There is no agreement among the commentators or 
among the courts on the question whether 2-316 preempts the field 
of warranty disclaimers and so excludes 2-302 from any operation 
here."I8 The debate concerning the applicability of the unconscio-
nability section to warranty disclaimers was fueled, if not begun, 
by Professor Leff in his classic article on unconscionability.17 The 
9. 767 F.2d at 298. 
10. [d. The second jury was impaneled to hear only the issue of damages following the 
judgment n.o.v., [d. 
11. [d. at 302-04. First, the appellate court affirmed the district court's finding of uncon-
scionability. [d. at 302. Second, the court affirmed the district court's grant of plaintiff's 
motion for a judgment n.O.v. on the breach of implied warranty question, [d. at 304, after 
carefully examining five arguments advanced by the defendant. [d. at 302-304. The concur-
ring opinion contains no specific dissent but states that the affirmance of unconscionability 
is based upon the unequal position of the parties. [d. 
12. [d. at 299. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. at 302. 
15. [d. at 299. 
16. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERICAL 
CODE 478 (2d ed. 1980). It is interesting to note that even the hornbook authors, Professors 
White and Summers, do not agree on this question. One of them believes that the draftsmen 
of the U.C.C. never intended § 2-302 to be an overlay on the disclaimer provisions of § 2-
316. [d. at 481. 
17. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115. U. PA. L. 
REV. 485 (1967) [hereinafter Leff]. 
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foundation of Leff's argument, as espoused by the defendant Har-
ris Seed, is that section 2-316 unequivocably authorized disclaim-
ing the implied warranty of merchantability. IS In fact, the section 
sets forth clear, easy to meet standards for disclaiming warran-
ties. 19 Section 2-316(2) details the specifics for disclaiming the im-
plied warranty of merchantability as follows: 
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of 
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention 
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to 
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be 
by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties 
of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warran-
ties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."'o 
In light of the detailed disclaimer instructions of the section and 
that neither the section nor its official comment contains any refer-
ence to section 2-302 or unconscionability, Professor Left' main-
tained that warranty disclaimers should not be stricken as uncon-
scionable.:n Nevertheless, most of the articles that examined 
section 2-302 and its applicability to warranty disclaimers have ap-
proved its application22 as has the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in the instant case. While warranty disclaimers are not in them-
selves unconscionable under the Code, a particular disclaimer 
18. 767 F.2d at 299. 
19. Leff, supra note 17, at 523. 
20. V.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977) (emphasis added). 
21. One of Professor Leff's most convincing arguments that the draftsman never in-
tended § 2-302 to apply to § 2-316 warranty disclaimers is the fact that § 2-316 contains no 
reference of any kind to § 2-302, although nine other sections of Article 2 contain such 
references (V.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2-204, 2-205, 2-207, 2-303, 2-508, 2-615, 2-718, 2-719). Leff, 
supra note 17, at 523. Reference to unconscionability in § 2-719 on limitation of remedies 
and in the Comments thereto is especially significant since a warranty disclaimer is often 
coupled with a limitation of remedy provision. The instant case is no exception. Harris Seed 
disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability and limited the buyer's remedy to re-
payment of the purchase price of the seed. Code Comment 3 to § 2-719 provides that while a 
limitation of remedy provision may not operate in an unconscionable manner, a "seller in all 
cases is free to disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Section 2-316." V.C.C. § 2-719 
comment 3 (1977). Accordingly, if warranty disclaimers are not subject to § 2-302, then in 
many cases even though the liinited remedy would be deleted if unconscionable, the plaintiff 
would not have a cause of action in the absence of an express warranty. 
22. See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L.J. 757 (1969); Murray, 
Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 V. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing 
Unconscionability Problems, 117 V. Pa. L. Rev. 931 (1969). 
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under special circumstances may be found to be unconscionable.23 
Section 2-302 provides that a court may find, as a matter of law, 
any clause of a contract to be unconscionable. Furthermore, most 
of the cases described in the Code Comments to section 2-302, as 
being illustrative of fact situations where its provisions would be 
applicable, are warranty disclaimer cases.24 Finally, section 2-316 
does not claim to be immune from the principle of 
unconscionabili ty. 211 
The court of appeals holding that section 2-316 warranty dis-
claimers are subject to section 2-302 on unconscionability is signifi-
cant precedent. The most similar Michigan case was Mallory v. 
Conida Warehouses, Inc. 28 In the Mallory case, the defendant sold 
kidney bean seeds to the plaintiffs, and the beans developed a dis-
ease known as halo blight.27 The trial court found that the war-
ranty disclaimer" was ineffective and submitted the question of 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability to the jury. The 
trial court also found that the remedy provision limiting buyer's 
remedy to the price of the seed was unconscionable and, thus, the 
jury was instructed on the measure of damages including conse-
quential damages. The jury found that the bean seed was defective 
and awarded money damages to the plaintiffs for crop loss. The 
Michigan appellate court affirmed the trial court.28 
Therefore, while Mallory is similar to the instant case there is 
one major difference. In Mallory, the trial court did not address 
the question of whether the warranty disclaimer was unconsciona-
ble. The court never reached the question because it ruled that the 
warranty disclaimer was ineffective because it was not conspicuous 
and because the language used suggested that warranties were in-
cluded rather than excluded.29 In a number of cases courts have 
23. Ellinghaus, supra note 22, at 793-94. 
24. The appellate court quotes from White & Summers that, in seven of the ten cases 
described in Comment 1 to § 2-302, disclaimers of warranty were denied full effect. 767 F.2d 
at 299. 
25. See Ellinghaus, supra note 22, at 793-94; Murray, supra note 22, at 45; Spanogle, 
supra note 22, at 957. 
26. 134 Mich. App. 28, 350 N.W.2d 825 (1984); appeal denied 422 Mich. 958, 372 
N.W.2d 515 (1985). 
27. 134 Mich. App. at 30, 350 N.W.2d at 827. 
28. [d. at 33. 350 N.W.2d at 828. The dissent did not deal with the warranty disclaimer 
or limitation of remedy issues. 
29. [d. at 31, 350 N.W.2d at 827. 
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not reached the question of application of section 2-302 to a war-
ranty disclaimer, because of a finding that the disclaimer is ineffec-
tive for failing to be conspicuous as required by the U.C.C.30 By 
reaching the question in the instant case and determining that sec-
tion 2-302 is applicable to warranty disclaimers, the court of ap-
peals has given disgruntled buyers a potential ground for recovery. 
Apparently, this result is consistent with the majority of courts 
having considered the question.31 Nevertheless, it is still unlikely 
that numerous warranty disclaimers will be held ineffective as un-
conscionable, at least in a commercial setting where the relation-
ship is not as one-sided as to give to one party the power to impose 
unconscionable terms on the other party.32 In the instant case the 
court of appeals did not determine whether the plaintiff farmers 
were merchants, and thus, whether the transaction at issue oc-
curred in a true commercial setting. The court held that the clause 
at issue was unconscionable even if considered in a "commercial 
setting."3s 
The major problem with predicting whether a court will find a 
contract clause to be unconscionable is the absence of a definitive 
standard for unconscionability. Section 2-302 on unconscionability 
provides: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of 
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, 
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination." 
Thus, the Code section does not define unconscionability, nor are 
factors or elements of unconscionability enumerated.31> Further-
30. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1982); Blanken-
ship v. Northtown Ford, Inc., 95 Ill. App. 3d 303, 420 N.E.2d 167 (1981). 
31. At least that was the conclusion of one commentator. Fahlgren, Unconscionability: 
Warranty Disclaimers and Consequential Damage Limitations, 20 St. Louis V.L.J. 435, 471 
(1976). 
32. White & Summers, supra note 16, at 474; 767 F.2d at 299-300. 
33. 767 F.2d at 300 n.4. 
34. V.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). 
35. Duesenberg, Practitioner's View of Contract Unconscionability, 8 V.C.C. L.J. 237 
HeinOnline -- 1986 Det. C.L. Rev. 299 1986
1986) Contracts 299 
more, courts have seldom explicitly defined the term "unconscio-
nability." The definition most frequently used is the one found in 
an early English case stating that an unconscionable bargain is one 
"such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make 
on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on 
the other."3s Accordingly, most courts have looked to the code 
comment for guidance. The Comment states that the principle un-
derlying the unconscionability section is "one of prevention of op-
pression and unfair surprise ... and not the disturbance of alloca-
tion of risks because of superior bargaining power."37 
This language has caused a debate among the courts and com-
mentators as to whether the relative bargaining power of the par-
ties is even a proper consideration under section 2-302.38 Virtually 
an equal number of cases can be found to say that inequality of 
bargaining power is not a consideration,39 or that the relative bar-
gaining power of the parties is a factor to consider in determining 
whether the clause or contract is unconscionable.40 
In Martin, the trial court relied upon a Michigan Court of Ap-
peals decision, Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone CO.,'l for a stan-
dard of unconscionability. In Allen, emphasis was placed upon the 
relative bargaining power of the parties to determine whether a 
limitation of remedy provision was unconscionable.42 Thus, the 
court of appeals in Martin was faced with selecting a side in the 
debate over the significance of bargaining power. The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, in holding that 
relative bargaining power is an appropriate consideration in deter-
mining unconscionability under the Michigan Uniform Commercial 
Code.43 
(1976). 
36. The equity court standard was adopted in the early English case of Earl of Chester-
field v. Janssen, 2 Yes. Sr. 125,28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750). The standard set forth in 
that case was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Hume v. United States, 132 
U.S. 406 (1889). 
37. V.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1977). 
38. 767 F.2d at 300. 
39. See, e.g., State v. Avco Fin. Servo of New York, Inc., 429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 406 N.E.2d 
1075 (1980). 
40. See e.g., Leonedas Realty Corp. V. Brodowsky, 454 N.Y.S.2d 183, 115 Misc.2d 88 
(1982). 
41. 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969). 
42. [d. at 637-40. 
43. 767 F.2d at 301. 
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In the opinion of this commentator, the court of appeals took 
the correct side. Clearly, inequality of bargaining power without 
more is not enough to establish unconscionability.'4 If it were 
enough, courts would constantly be forced to reallocate the eco-
nomic risks of contracts because even in a commercial setting size 
and monopoly strength create unequal bargaining positions. How-
ever, "[i]f inequality of bargaining power exists, the inquiry is 
whether the inequality resulted in unfair surprise through mislead-
ing bargaining techniques or oppression through inclusion of one-
sided terms."4I! The inquiry is whether the clause is so one-sided as 
to be unconscionable under circumstances existing at the time of 
the making of the contract. 
As analyzed by the court of appeals, the circumstances of the 
instant case did amount to unfair surprise and oppression. Al-
though the clauses in question had appeared in previous seed order 
forms, Harris Seed's decision to discontinue hot water treatment of 
its cabbage seed substantially altered the final contract of the par-
ties. Because of the latent nature of the defect and the sudden 
change in standard practice with the notice of such change being 
given after the seed order was placed, Harris Seed had a duty to 
bring the clause to the attention of the plaintiffs. '6 As enunciated 
in the Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp.," where a contracting party has 
immense bargaining power with an uncounseled layperson, there is 
an affirmative duty to obtain voluntary, knowing assent.48 Given 
the unique facts of the instant case, the court of appeals affirmed 
the district court's finding of unconscionability.'9 
In addressing the final issue on appeal, whether the district 
court erred in granting the plaintiffs' motion for judgment n.o.v. on 
the breach of implied warranty issue, the appellate court consid-
44. See, Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 113 Wis.2d 
258, 334 N.W.2d 922 (1983); Lamoille Grain Co., Inc. v. St. Johnsburg and Lamoille County 
R.R., 135 Vt. 5, 369 A.2d 1389 (1976). 
45. Comment, Disclaimer of Implied Warranties from a Manufacturer's Perspective, 80 
Dick. L. Rev. 566, 581 (1976). 
46. 767 F.2d at 301. 
47. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976). This case was in Hipp, Contracts: Annual Sur-
vey of Michigan Law, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 397 (1978). The survey correctly indicates that the 
Johnson case is "significant because it refuses to follow the overly strict general rule that 
unconscionability does not apply to contracts between merchants." Id. at 409. 
48. 415 F. Supp. at 269. 
49. 767 F.2d at 302. 
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ered five arguments advanced by the defendant.60 Two of these ar-
guments are worthy of discussion. First, Harris Seed argued that 
there is no breach of implied warranty of merchantability where 
there is no economic loss. Defendants claim since plaintiffs made 
as much profit as in previous years, despite the fact that large por-
tions of their cabbage crops were destroyed, they were not dam~ 
aged. This argument has a carnival shell game flavor to it - it mixes 
together two distinct legal questions and confuses the resolution. 
The amount of damage suffered is not relative to whether there 
was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. Under the 
implied warranty of merchantability section,61 "a plaintiff must 
prove (1) that a merchant sold goods, (2) which were not 'mer~ 
chantable' at the time of sale, and (3) injury and damages to the 
plaintiff or his property (4) caused proximately and in fact by the 
defective nature of the goods, and (5) notice to seller of injury."152 
The cabbage seed was defective, it was diseased, and that disease 
destroyed large portions of the plaintiffs' property - the cabbage 
crops. The cabbage crop loss was proximately caused by the defec-
tive cabbage seed. To say that the defective seed caused the plain-
tiffs to make a greater profit because of the market shortage of 
cabbage and, thus, plaintiffs were not damaged, is to permit and 
encourage sale of diseased seed. The court of appeals correctly 
found that there was a breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability. Since the court did not know what the market 
price for cabbage would have been had the plaintiffs been able to 
harvest their entire crop disease free, the court computed these 
damages on the basis of the market price when they. sold the 
salvageable cabbage. 
The other argument presented by Harris Seed which is of some 
interest relates to the Michigan Seed Law.63 Harris Seed argued 
that there could be no breach of implied warranty under the 
U.C.C. because the state seed law preempts the field and sets forth 
the full extent of a seed merchant's obligations.64 The court of ap-
50. Id. at 302-04. 
51. V.C.C. § 2-314 (1977). 
52. See White & Summers, supra note 16, at 343. 
53. Mich. Compo Laws § 286.701-716 (1967). 
54. 767 F.2d at 303. Harris Seed argued that since the Michigan Court of Appeals case 
relied upon by the district court was being appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, the 
Court of Appeals decision was stayed and inapplicable. The case was Mallory v. Conida 
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peals correctly found that sale of seeds is subject to the provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code.1i1i The Michigan Seed Law is 
merely a disclosure statute requiring that certain labels be placed 
on seed and enumerating penalties for failure to comply with the 
statute's requirements.1i6 
In conclusion, Martin is a significant case for Michigan jurispru-
dence because of its application of the unconscionability doctrine 
to a warranty disclaimer in a commercial setting. However, 
whether it will be used extensively in commercial cases is yet unde-
cided. The plaintiffs in Martin were farmers, and farmers, al-
though capable of acquiring merchant status,1i7 continue to be clas-
sified and treated with consumers rather than merchants. liS The 
overwhelming majority of cases where warranty disclaimers have 
been held unconscionable involve consumers and farmers.1i9 
Warehouse, Inc., and as previously noted in note 26, leave to appeal was denied by the 
Michigan Supreme Court. See supra note 26. 
55. 767 F.2d at 303. 
56. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS. § 286.705 (1967), which sets forth the information reo 
quired on a label or tag where the contents are vegetable, herbs or flower seed. 
57. A farmer is not per se a merchant. Rush Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Missouri Farmers 
Ass'n. Inc., 555 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App. 1977). Under specific circumstances, that seem to vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, farmers may be merchants. See, e.g., Sebasty v. Perschke 
404 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. App. 1980); Cargill, Inc. v. Gaard, 84 Wis.2d 138, 267 N.W.2d 22 
(1978); Continental Grain Co. v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (D. Ill. 1975). This commentator 
is unaware of any published Michigan appellate court opinion dealing with the potential 
merchant status of a farmer. However, it is interesting to note that a pre-Code Michigan 
case discussed by Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr., in the practice commentary to § 2-302 in Michi-
gan Compiled Laws Annotated, involved the purchase of seed by a farmer. The case is cited 
as one which would today potentially be decided under the unconscionability provision. In 
that case, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to enforce the seller's disclaimers of war-
ranty and held the seller responsible for the farmer-buyer's crop loss. See Phelps v. Grand 
Rapids Growers, Inc., 341 Mich. 62, 67 N.W.2d 59 (1954). 
58. A commentator, in a three part article on the farmer's status as a merchant, pointed 
out that it is our romantic ideals concerning the rugged individualism of the American 
farmer, that has lead courts to be protective of the farmer and shrink from acknowledging 
his merchant status. Squillante, Is He or Isn't He a Merchant?-Farmer, 82 Com. L.J. 155, 
367, 430 (1977). 
59. Many of the so-called commercial setting cases involving warranty disclaimers being 
held unconscionable involve farmers and in most cases the farmer is suing because of defec-
tive or diseased seed. For a case similar to the instant case, see, Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 
Wash. App. 99,666 P.2d 899 (1983). In a corn seed case, the court found the seller liable for 
a breach of express warranty based upon language on the seed bags. The warranty dis-
claimer was inconsistent with the express warranty and so the warranty was unenforceable. 
However, the limitation of remedy provision, limiting lawyer's recovery to the sale price of 
the seed corn, was held not to be unconscionable. Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 728 
F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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II. PROMISSORY FRAUD 
The facts in Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, 
Inc.,60 are extremely sketchy. However, it appears that the plain-
tiff, Coal Resources, held leases on certain property in Virginia. 
Defendant, Gulf & Western, pursuant to an acquisition agreement, 
was to develop the lease-holds and assume all duties, express or 
implied, arising under those leases.61 Defendant's performance was 
significant since Coal Resources was to receive a multiple of Gulf & 
Western's profits during the first two years after the signing of the 
acquisition agreement.62 The extent of defendant's obligations 
under the acquisition agreement was the subject of the dispute. 
Plaintiff asserted claims in the United States District Court in 
Ohio alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory fraud; and (3) 
violations of federal securities law. A jury found defendant liable 
on all claims, awarding in excess of $28,000,000. Plaintiff subse-
quently accepted a remittance of $12,050,000 as full compensation 
for all jury awards.63 The district court also granted defendant's 
motion for judgment n.o.v. on the securities claim.6• 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished 
opinion6 !! affirmed the judgment n.o.v. on the securities claim, and 
reversed and remanded for new trial on the other claims. Plaintiff 
filed a petition for rehearing and the instant opinion resulted. On 
rehearing the majority affirmed the judgment n.o.v. on the securi-
ties law claim, reversed the judgment on the promissory fraud 
claim, and vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial on 
the breach of contract claim.66 
In reviewing the instant case, three issues appear worthy of re-
view. First, whether a promise not reflected in a written contract 
containing an integration clause may be subject to an action for 
promissory fraud. Second, whether implied obligations not directly 
reflected in a written contract containing an integration clause may 
be the subject of an action for breach of contract. Finally, whether 
60. 756 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1985). 
61. 756 F.2d at 449. 
62. ld. at 448. 
63. ld. at 445. 
64. ·ld. 
65. 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984). 
66. 765 F.2d at 451·52. 
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the plaintiff obtained a double recovery by recelvmg a damage 
award reflecting the benefit of bargain and the monetary 
equivalent of contract rescission, stemming from a finding of liabil-
ity on both the breach of contract and the promissory fraud causes 
of action. 
The first issue dealing with promissory fraud is the most inter-
esting and the one over which the dissenter disagrees most vehe-
mently. Plaintiff alleged that defendant promised to invest $3.9 
million in the leaseholds, with knowledge that the promise would 
not be performed. The promise was not included in the written 
acquisition agreement which contained an integration clause.67 The 
court of appeals defined promissory fraud as a contractual promise 
made with no present intention of performing it.68 Even though 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show promissory fraud,69 the 
court invoked the parol evidence rule since the written contract 
contained an integration clause.7o 
In arriving at this rule of law, that extrinsic evidence is inadmis-
sible to establish a promissory fraud theory when the contract con-
tains an integration clause, the majority opinion cited no authority. 
67. Id. at 446. 
68. Id. In support of its definition the court cited Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell In-
formation Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1982) (construing Ohio law) and Tibbs v. Na-
tional Homes Const. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1977). The Tibbs case 
accurately explains the law of promissory fraud in Ohio and a majority of jurisdictions as 
follows: 
It is generally true that fraud cannot be predicated upon promises or representa-
tions relating to future actions or conduct. 
Sometimes referred to as an excepton to this rule - although in reality simply an 
application of the rule to extended facts - is the instance of the malfactor who 
makes his promise of future action, occurrence, or conduct, and who at the time 
he makes it, has no intention of keeping his promise. In such a case, the requisite 
misrepresentation of an existing fact is said to be found in the lie as to his ex-
. isting mental attitude and present intent. (emphasis added). 
52 Ohio App.2d at 286-287, 369 N.E.2d at 1222-23. 
In summary, since fraud must relate to existing facts, it is said that fraud cannot be predi-
cated upon a promise relating to future actions. However, the general rule is that a promise 
made without the intent to perform it is fraud. Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol 
Evidence Rule, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 877, 888 (1961). 
69. 756 F.2d at 446. The court of appeals cited Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. National 
Metal Abrasive Co., 101 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1939), which provides "[lIt is likewise the general 
rule that a promise made with present intention not to perform is a misrepresentation of an 
existing fact which may be shown by extrinsic evidence to have induced the execution of the 
contract, and so be a ground for avoiding it." Id. at 491. 
70. 756 F.2d at 447. 
HeinOnline -- 1986 Det. C.L. Rev. 305 1986
1986] Contracts 305 
Instead, the majority merely distinguished Dunn,71 relied upon by 
the plaintiff and the court in defining promissory fraud. The ma-
jority stated that Dunn is distinguishable because the Dunn opin-
ion does not indicate that an integration clause was involved. The 
majority viewed this promissory fraud theory as an attempt to add 
terms to an integrated agreement.72 Accordingly, the majority used 
the parol evidence rule as a bar to the extrinsic evidence and found 
defendant entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the promis-
sory fraud claim.73 
Judge Morton, in dissent, argued that the parol evidence rule 
does not bar eyidence of fraudulent inducement because the evi-
dence is offered not to add or vary the terms of the contract, but to 
avoid it all together, including the integration clause.74 The dissent 
cited numerous cases for this proposition.711 The majority opinion 
answered the dissent in a footnote, arguing that those cases are 
inapplicable because the case at bar did not involve a claim of 
fraud in the inducement, but instead promissory fraud. 76 
Authorities do not agree on whether an integration bars proof of 
promissory fraud." However, a majority of jurisdictions now treat 
71. See supra note 68. 
72. This commentator will discuss infra whether adding the $3.9 million development 
promise to the acquisition agreement was the intention of the plaintiff. Case law differs as to 
whether the only relief available in a promissory fraud cause of action is rescission or avoid-
ance of the entire contract. See Sweet supra, note 68, at 900. 
73. 756 F.2d at 447. 
74. [d. at 452. 
75. Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines, 647 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1981); Centronics Financial 
Corp. v. El Conquistador Hotel Corp., 573 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1978); Niehaus v. Haven Parke 
West, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 24,440 N.E.2d 584 (1981). The Niehaus case involved allegations 
that misrepresentations induced the appellants to enter into a contract which contained a 
merger clause. The Ohio court held that a merger clause could not prevent the admissibility 
of evidence of fraud, quoting from the Ohio legal encyclopedia as follows: 
It is a general rule that where one party to a contract has been induced to enter 
into it through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation of the other party as to mate-
rial matters, the defrauded party does not become bound by its terms, notwith-
standing the contract contains a provision that there are no agreements or state-
ments binding upon the parties except those contained therein. Fraud which 
enters into the actual making of a contract cannot be excluded from the reach of 
the law by any formal phrase inserted in the contract itself. 
[d. 2 Ohio App. 3d at __ , 440 N.E.2d at 586. 
76. 756 F.2d at 452 n.2. 
77. See, Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest? 36 
Vand. L. Rev. 1383, 1400 (1983), (citing J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
112 n.77 (1977». 
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the making of promises without intent to perform as the 
equivalent of a misrepresentation of fact and, thus, treat such mis-
representations like fraud in the inducement.78 Ohio is recognized 
by Tibbs as one of those majority jurisdictions.79 Furthermore, in 
Niehaus, cited in the dissenting opinion, the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals held that a merger or integration could not be used to ex-
clude extrinsic evidence that a contract had been induced by fraud, 
deceit, and misrepresentation.80 Accordingly, it appears that the 
dissent was correct and evidence of promissory fraud, which is 
treated as fraud in the inducement, is admissible even in the face 
of a merger or integration clause. 
The second issue worthy of review involves the breach of con-
tract cause of action. Plaintiff's breach of contract theory was 
three-fold.81 Defendant was alleged to have breached an implied 
obligation to develop the leaseholds in a reasonably diligent fash-
ion according to generally accepted mining principles. Defendant 
was alleged to have breached certain duties imposed by the leases, 
which defendant expressly assumed in the acquisition agreement. 
Finally, defendant was alleged to have breached express promises 
contained in the acquisition agreement. 
The court of appeals held that implied obligations not directly 
reflected in a written contract containing an integration clause are 
not enforceable. The clear impact of the integration clause was 
that neither party was bound to discharge obligations not con-
tained in the written agreement. Accordingly, the court held that a 
duty to develop the property in a reasonable diligent fashion may 
78. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 77, at 286-87; Sweet, supra note 68, at 888-89. 
An excellent synopsis may be found in Professor Farnsworth's hornbook on Contracts as 
follows: 
It is generally agreed that the parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic evidence 
to show fraud as a ground for rescission, a tort action for damages, or reformation. 
Most courts treat promissory fraud like other types of fraud for this purpose. 
However, a few courts have held that the parol evidence rule bars extrinisc evi-
dence of promissory fraud. (footnotes omitted) 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 465-6 (1982). 
79. See supra note 68. 
80. See supra note 75 for the discussion of the Niehaus case. The contract in that case 
contained the following merger clause: "This Agreement and the Exhibits attached hereto 
... contain the entire agreement between the parties hereto . . . and supercede all prior 
arrangements or understandings between the parties hereto relating to the subject matter 
hereof." Niehaus, 2 Ohio App. 3d at __ ,440 N.E.2d at 586. 
81. 756 F.2d at 448. 
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not be implied under the acquisition agreement.82 Thus, defend-
ant's failure to perform according to generally accepted mining 
principles could not form the basis of a breach of contract action 
under this implied theory. 
Judge Morton again dissented, arguing that an implied duty of 
this nature is to be read into a written contract absent an express 
provision to the contrary.83 Again the dissent seems to have taken 
the better position. The parol evidence rule, after all, merely ex-
cludes extrinsic evidence of prior and contemporaneous negotia-
tions and agreements of the parties.8• It does not speak to terms 
implied in a contract by law. Implied in law terms are such that 
they are attached to the contract on grounds of policy without any 
expression by the parties.811 Were this not the case, an integration 
clause could bar such implied terms as good faith and commercial 
reasonableness in a written contract governed by the V.C.C. Such a 
result would be unsupportable. 
Ironically, despite the majority's finding on the implied term, 
the court found potential for liability under plaintiff's alternative 
theory of breach of contract, that defendant had failed to perform 
duties imposed by the leases. Emphasizing the two distinct ques-
tions posed, the court reiterated its position that the integration 
clause prevented obligations from being implied under the acquisi-
tion agreement. However, in that agreement, defendant expressly 
assumed all duties, express or implied, arising from the leases. The 
leases required development of the property in a "diligent, work-
manlike manner" in accordance with the standards of good mining 
practice.86 Thus, defendant was potentially liable under this theory 
for the same behavior that had been rejected as a basis for the 
earlier implied theory of liability. 
With respect to the final issue, the majority and dissent agree 
that the plaintiff obtained a double recovery by receiving benefit of 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 453. Judge Morton cited the Ohio case of Beer v. Griffith, 61 Ohio St.2d 119, 
399 N.E.2d 1227 (1980), for the proposition that in the absence of an express provision to 
the contrary, a mineral lease includes an implied covenant to reasonably develop the land. 
The generalized integration clause fell short, in i.J.is opinion, of being the type of express 
provision needed to rebut this presumed duty. 
84. 3 A.L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 (1960). 
85. 3 A.L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 579 at 412 (1960). 
86. 756 F.2d at 450. 
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the bargain damages on the contract breach and the monetary 
equivalent of contract rescission through its promissory fraud the-
ory.87 The court held that a plaintiff may not have a contract both 
enforced and rescinded at the same time. The dissent suggested 
that bifurcating the issues of liability and damages would solve the 
problem. Under bifurcation, if the defendant were liable for both 
promissory fraud and breach of contract, the plaintiff would be 
forced to declare the theory of liability under which it wished to 
proceed, and seek damages accordingly.88 However, the majority's 
reversal of the promissory fraud claim and remanding of the 
breach of contract claim rendered the issue moot in this case. 
By way of comment, the problem does arise because the typical 
remedy is avoidance of the contract and rescission where fraud in 
the inducement of a contract is claimed.89 However, Professor 
Sweet's article on promissory fraud and the parol evidence rule 
discussed at length the potential remedies available where promis-
sory fraud is alleged and established.90 The typical remedy, and 
the only remedy available in some jurisdictions, is rescission of the 
contract and restoration of the status quO.91 However, in many in-
stances the courts have allowed the victim of a false promise to 
either sue for damages in a tort action of deceit, or affirm the con-
tract and sue for its breach.92 
Although mooted by the majority's decision, by applying the al-
ternative remedies to the instant case it would have been possible 
for the plaintiff to recover tort damages on the promissory fraud 
claim and breach of contract damages on the contract claim. Fur-
thermore, since the $3.9 million development promise was not cov-
ered by the written agreement, it might be possible to enforce that 
promise separately as a collateral agreement and recover on both 
theories without it being viewed as a duplicative recovery. This lat-
ter result would appear to be exactly what the majority was avoid-
ing by using the parol evidence rule as a bar where it appeared 
87. Id. at 446, 453. 
88. Id. at 453. 
89. See supra note 69. 
90. Sweet, supra note 68. 
91. Sweet, supra note 68 at 897. The article discusses why such a limitation is not desir-
able. Id. at 899. 
92. Id. at 900. Professor Sweet's article stated that there are quite a few cases that allow 
an action for damages sounding in tort. Id. at 891-92 n.79. 
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that the plaintiff wished to add the oral fraudulent promise to the 
written agreement. 
III. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
The final three cases involve the troublesome, frequently liti-
gated problem of contract interpretation. In all three cases the 
court of appeals affirmed application of or applied the plain mean-
ing rule93 to the language of three different agreements. In apply-
ing this much criticized rule94 the court held that three words: 
"amendment," "method" and "complete" were ambiguous and 
should be interpreted in light of their plain meaning rather than in 
light of the proposed extrinsic evidence. 
In the first case, Union Oil Co. of California v. Service Oil Co., 
Inc.,9r. Union brought its cause of action against Service for non-
payment under a jobber sales agreement and against Hugh E. 
Mays, Sr., who had executed a separate guaranty agreement ren-
dering him personally liable for all extensions of credit by Union to 
Service. Factually, Mays signed the guaranty agreement on April 
11, 1975. Later, on August 1, 1975, Union entered into a jobber 
sales agreement with Service, a distributor of gasoline products in 
Knoxville, Tennessee, whereby Service would resell the products 
purchased from Union to local service stations.96 
In 1978, Union withdrew from the Knoxville retail gasoline mar-
ket and sold its company-owned service stations to Service. As part 
of the sale on February 12, 1978, Union entered into a new jobber 
sales agreement. Union and Service signed an agreement cancelling 
93. The "plain meaning" rule developed in the field of statutory interpretation as well as 
contract interpretation. "The concept of the plain meaning of language appears to have 
retained more vitality in the field of contract interpretation than in the area of statutory 
interpretation." FARNSWORTH, supra note 78, at 501. Under this plain meaning rule, evi-
dence of prior negotiations may be used for the purpose of interpretation only if the lan-
guage in the writing is unclear, in the sense of being ambiguous or vague. Id. at 502. "[IJf a 
writing appears clear and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined by the 
four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature." J. 
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 98 (1970). 
94. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS at 98 n. 32 (1970) (citing Corbin, Grismore, 
McCormick and Thayer). Also note that the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restate-
ment Second of Contracts explicitly condemn the plain meaning rule. U.C.C. § 2-202 com-
ment l(c) (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 and comments (1979). 
95. 766 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1985). 
96. Id. at 225. 
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the 1975 jobber sales agreement on March 7, 1978. No new guar-
anty was signed at that time, and Union on several occasions asked 
Mays to sign a new guaranty.97 Union filed this cause of action in 
November of 1983, after Service began falling behind in its pay-
ments, and Union terminated the 1978 jobber sales agreement on 
December 19, 1983.98 
Mays defended the action based upon an allegation that his 
guaranty was terminated by the 1978 cancellation agreement.99 
Mays produced an affidavit which stated that Union representa-
tives told him that the 1978 cancellation terminated the guaranty. 
Mays' agreement and affidavit were rejected by the trial court as 
"self-serving parol evidence," and the court granted summary 
judgment against both defendants for the amount of the debt. loo 
Defendants filed a motion to be relieved of the summary judgment 
because of newly discovered evidence, but the trial court refused to 
grant the motion because the defendants failed to show due dili-
gence as required by the rule. The rejected new evidence consisted 
of an affidavit by Charles Venable who represented Union during 
the 1978 negotiations of the jobber agreement. The affidavit stated 
that Venable was told by union to inform Mays of the cancellation 
of Mays' guaranty and that he had so informed Mays.IOI 
On appeal, the key issue was whether the 1978 cancellation 
agreement also terminated the guaranty agreement. Mays relied on 
the following language from the cancellation agreement: "[T]he 
undersigned parties hereby mutually agree that [the jobber sales] 
agreement, and any amendments thereto shall be and the same 
hereby are cancelled and terminated ... (emphasis added)."lo2 
Thus Mays argued that the word "amendments" referred to and 
included the guaranty. Mays maintained that his affidavit 
presented a factual question as to the meaning of the word 
97. [d. 
98. [d. By February of 1984 Service owed Union more than $350,000 under the 1978 
agreement. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 226. The major problem was that the guaranty specified the manner under 
which it could be terminated. Termination of the guaranty required written notice and pay-
ment of any amount then owed on the jobber contract. Mays did not comply with these 
requirements. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
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"amendments. "103 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Tennessee law which 
provides that "parol evidence is not admissible to interpret a con-
tract when there is no ambiguity on the face of the contract."lO' 
The court of appeals held that there was no ambiguity in the word 
"amendments." Amendments are modifications that postdate a 
contract and the personal guaranty was executed prior to the 1975 
jobber agreement. 10& Furthermore, the court held that the word 
"amendments" could not have included Mays' guaranty because 
the parties to the two agreements were different. loa Consequently, 
the intent of the parties as to the meaning of the contract terms 
was determined from the face of the contract, thereby excluding 
Mays' affidavit and any other parol evidence on the intention of 
the parties. The case was ultimately reversed and remanded on a 
completely separate issue involving a federal rule of civil 
procedure. 107 
In the second case, Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Profit Counselors, 
Inc.,108 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Ohio law to de-
termine whether the word "method," as used in the Action Report 
of May 4, was ambiguous. Plaintiff, Whitaker-Merrell, is a general 
contractor in the construction industry and the defendant, Profit 
Counselors, is a professional business consultation firm. Defendant 
represented to the plaintiff that it could improve plaintiff's job 
cost system, particularly the overhead allocation system. Accord-
ingly, the parties entered into a written contract in March of 1979, 
whereby defendant would advise the plaintiff and develop an over-
head allocation method for its bidding procedure. Plaintiff used 
the overhead allocation method provided by defendant and also 
103. [d. at 227. 
104. The appellate court accurately cited two Tennessee cases upholding the plain 
meaning rule. Cartwright v. Giacosa, 216 Tenn. 18, 390 S.W.2d 204 (1965); McMillin v. 
Great Southern Corp., 480 S.W.2d 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). Numerous recent cases can be 
found reaffirming the viability of the plain meaning rule in Tennessee. See e.g., Jones v. 
Brooks, 696 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1985); Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Petty, 664 S.W.2d 77 
(Tenn. App. 1983); Pierce v. Flynn, 656 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. App. 1983); Coble Sys., Inc. v. 
Gifford Co., 627 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. App. 1981); Ward v. Berry and Assocs., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 
372 (Tenn. App. 1981); Moore v. Moore, 603 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. App. 1980). 
105. 766 F.2d at 227. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 228. 
108. 748 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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used the exact percentage markups supplied by an employee of de-
fendant in acquiring fifty-seven construction projects. I09 In 1980, 
one of plaintiff's in-house accountants informed management that 
the percentage markups provided by defendant were too low, and 
that as a result plaintiff failed to recover $177,000 in overhead on 
the fifty-seven jobs. llo 
Plaintiff brought this cause of action to recover the loss. Profit 
Counselors defended on the basis that its only obligation under the 
contract was to develop an overhead allocation method and the ac-
tual percentage markups supplied were meant to be illustrative 
only.lll At the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the trial court di-
rected a verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the contract 
required defendant to provide a method for overhead allocation 
only, the contract did not require defendant to provide actual per-
centage markups and those markups supplied were meant to be 
illustrative only.112 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's 
directed verdict. llS 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the word 
"method" was not ambiguous. IH The plaintiff argued that the 
word was ambiguous in order to admit parol evidence to show that 
method was intended to include both an overhead allocation pro-
gram and the actual percentage markups to be used in the calcula-
tions. The court of appeals cited an old Ohio case reiterating the 
exception to the plain meaning rule of contract interpretation 
109. ld. at 355. 
110. ld. 
111. ld. 
112. ld. at 356. 
113. ld. 
114. ld. at 357. The case is unusual because the word "method," subject to interpreta· 
tion here, appeared in an Action Report drafted almost two months after the operating 
agreement, which this commentator believes is the contract of the parties. Accordingly, the 
court applied this rule of contract interpretation to a report written subsequent to the con-
tract. Probably, the best argument plaintiff presented was that the parties' agreement was a 
mixed oral and written contract. The court refused to adopt this agrument in light of the 
integration clause which appeared in the "operating agreement" as follows: "Profit Counsel-
ors, Inc. and the Client accept this Operating Agreement as constituting the entire agree-
ment between them with respect to all services to be rendered by Profit Counselors, Inc. to 
the client and its compensation therefor." 748 F.2d at 356. That the contract at minimum 
consisted of several writings, the operating agreement and subsequent action reports, is ac-
cepted by the court of appeals in its analysis. 
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where an ambiguity is found.1lIi Recent Ohio cases may be cited to 
support the proposition that the plain meaning rule is alive and 
well in Ohio. lls Accordingly, the court of appeals in this diversity 
action applied the correct, albeit criticized,117 rule of law. 
In the third case involving contract interpretation, J.I. Hass, Co. 
v. Jones-Teer,118 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Ken-
tucky law1l9 to resolve the issue of whether a subcontractor, in tak-
ing over a job already begun by a previous subcontractor, was enti-
tled to extra compensation for correcting the work of the previous 
subcontractor. Jones-Teer was the prime contractor for the con-
struction of the Smithland Dam on the Ohio River. Jones-Teer 
originally engaged All-State Contracting Company to paint the 
steel gates of the dam. All-State commenced the painting in 1977, 
but a dispute arose at the end of 1978 and All-State removed itself 
from the project. l20 Hass contracted with Jones-Teer to "com-
plete"l2l the painting job. After Hass began painting, defects were 
discovered in the painting previously done by All-State. Hass con-
tended that it was entitled to extra compensation for the corrective 
work. Jones-Teer declined to pay Hass' claims for additional com-
pensation, upon the ground that the subcontract required Hass to 
complete all painting at its own expense.122 Judgment was ren-
dered in favor of Hass for $17,920 for work performed by Hass 
before termination of the subcontract and all other claims were 
115. Id. at 357. The court of appeals cited Ohio Crane Co. v. Hicks, 110 Ohio St. 168, 143 
N.E. 388 (1924). It is somewhat unusual that this case is cited as the only authority for two 
reasons. First, the case involves an ambiguous contract or an exception to the plain meaning 
rule. Second, numerous recent Ohio cases can be found. reciting the plain meaning rule of 
contract interpretation. See infra note 116 for a listing of these cases. 
116. See e.g., John Deere Indus. Equip. Co. v. Gentile, 9 Ohio App. 3d 251, 459 N.E.2d 
611 (1983); Ranieri v. Terzano, 8 Ohio App. 3d 438, 457 N.E.2d 906 (1983); Pippin v. Kern-
Ward Bldg. Co., 8 Ohio App. 3d 196,456 N.E.2d 1235 (1982). 
117. See supra note 94. 
118. 755 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1985). 
119. Two suits were filed. Hass brought the first action in the United States District 
Court for New Jersey and the second in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky. The New Jersey action was transferred to the Western District of 
Kentucky where the two suits were consolidated for trial. Id. at 1265. 
120. The dispute between Jones-Teer and AU-State was settled by arbitration. Id. at 
1265 n. 1. 
121. "Complete" is the key word because the court had to decide whether the contract 
was ambiguous as to the scope of the work and whether "complete" meant go forward with 
the job or additionally do corrective work. Id. at 1266. 
122. Id. at 1265. 
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dismissed.12S Both parties appealed and the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed. l24 
The trial court struggled with the dilemma of contract interpre-
tation and preliminarily ruled, at the close of the first phase of the 
trial, that the subcontract was ambiguous with respect to the scope 
of the work. Based upon the parol evidence presented, the district 
court determined that Hass was only responsible for going forward 
with the painting. 1211 Jones-Teer petitioned the court to re-examine 
this preliminary finding of ambiguity and the trial court changed 
its original holding. Recognizing that the work could not be com-
pleted unless the Corps of Engineers' specifications were satisfied, 
the trial court reversed itself and ruled that the scope of the work 
requirement was clear, not ambiguous, and that Hass was to do all 
work required for the dam to be painted pursuant to the contract 
specifications.128 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's 
construction of the contract.127 
In affirming the issue the court of appeals did not discuss the 
standard applied by either court in interpreting the contract. One 
can only surmise, based upon the use of the term ambiguous, that 
the courts were applying the plain meaning rule. 128 The trial 
court's inconsistent decisions on the question of ambiguity only 
further emphasize the importance of using extrinsic evidence in 
resolving questions of contract interpretation.12B 
The court of appeal's opinion dealt with another issue of signifi-
cance to contract law. In addition to ambiguity, Hass further al-
leged misrepresentation in the formation of the contract. 1 SO Hass 
123. [d. at 1266. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. Thus, under the preliminary ruling Hass was not responsible for any corrective 
work. 
126. [d. at 1267. 
127. [d. 
128. This commentator could find no Kentucky case digested which explicity adopts the 
plain meaning rule. Several cases hold that in the absence of ambiguity a written instrument 
will be enforced strictly according to its terms. O'Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 413 
S.W.2d 891, 893 (Ky. 1967); Codell Const. Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 566 S.W.2d 
161, 164 (Ky. App. 1977). See a/so, Indian Refining Co. v. Baker, 284 Ky. 423, 145 S.W.2d 72 
(1941), providing that the interpretation of the parties should prevail only when the con-
tract sought to be construed is ambiguous. 284 Ky. __ , 145 S.W.2d at 74. 
129. One questions how the trial court could change its decision without examining the 
extrinsic evidence, specifically the intentions of the parties at the time of the contracting. 
130. 755 F.2d at 1267. Hass alleged fraud in the initial suit. On appeal, Hass accepted 
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had received assurances from Jones-Teer and American States In-
surance Company131 that the completed painting was satisfac-
tory,132 thus, Hass had a reasonable expectation that All-State's 
work was properly performed. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied on district court Judge Edward H. Johnstone's analysis of 
the facts created by the unexpected extensive remedial work. 
Judge Johnstone opined that the status of the painting previously 
done by All-State was misrepresented by Jones-Teer and American 
States. 133 Once Hass knew or had reason to know of the misrepre-
sentation, the contract became voidable. At that point Hass was 
faced with a choice of either rescinding the contract due to the 
mispresentation, or ratifying the contract, completing the painting, 
and later seeking damages.134 Hass had one irrevocable election; 
Hass could not avoid part of the contract and ratify part of the 
contract. 1311 An aggrieved party has but one election, either disaf-
firm the contract and seek its rescission or affirm the contract and 
seek a remedy by an action for damages.13s 
In conclusion, the three cases involving contract interpretation 
were correctly decided under the current law of Ohio, Tennessee 
and Kentucky. These cases are noteworthy, not because they 
change the law, but because they reaffirm a rule of law which has 
been almost universally criticized - the plain meaning rule.137 Since 
the rule has been abrogated by both the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts138 and by the Uniform Commerical Code,139 it is surpris-
the trial court's determination of misrepresentation rather than fraud. Id. 
131. [d. at 1265. American States Insurance Comapny acted as surety for All-State on 
their sub-contract with Jones-Teer. 
132. [d. 
133. See supra note 130. 
134. 755 F.2d at 1267. 
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 383 (1979) provides: "A contract cannot be 
avoided in part except that where one or more corresponding pairs of part performances 
have been fully performed by one or both parties the rest of the contract can be avoided." 
[d. Thus, a party cannot disaffirm part of the contract that is particularly disadvantageous 
to himself while affirming a more advantageoU3 part. This rule is in accord with Kentucky 
law. See, e.g., Dunn v. Tate, 268 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1954). 
136. Hampton v. Suter, 330 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Ct. App. Ky. 1959). 
137. See supra note 94. 
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1979), dealing with rules in aid of 
interpretation provides in relevant part: "Words and other conduct are interpreted in the 
light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is 
given great weight." [d. The comment in explanation speaks to the absence of a requirement 
of ambiguity: 
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ing that it remains the law in many jurisidictions. 
With a decline in the judicial reverence for the written word and with a 
growing recognition that the meaning of language may vary greatly ac-
cording to circumstances, it has become increasingly difficult to defend 
the restrictive view [the plain meaning rule), even though that view may 
tend to shorten the judicial process. If it is recognized that all language is 
infected with ambiguity and vagueness and that even language that 
seems on its face to have only one possible meaning may take on a differ-
ent meaning when circumstances are disclosed, it makes little sense for a 
court to ask whether language is on its face "ambiguous" or "vague" as 
opposed to "clear" or "plain."uo 
With time, undoubtedly, the plain meaning rule will be dis-
carded. However, for now we must face the reality that the court 
will substitute its own linguistic education and experience for that 
of the contracting parties, HI ignoring in some instances the true 
intentions of those parties. 
The rules in this Section are applicable to all manifestations of intention and all 
transactions. The rules are general in character, and serve merely as guides in the 
process of interpretation. They do not depend upon any determination that there 
is an ambiguity, but are used in determining what meanings are reasonably possi-
ble as well as in choosing among possible meanings. 
Id. at § 202 comment a (emphasis added). Furthermore, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 214 (1979) provides in relevant part: "Agreements and negotiations prior to or 
contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish. 
(c) the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated." Id. 
The comment then by way of explanation provides: 
Words, written or oral, cannot apply themselves to the subject matter. The ex-
pressions and general tenor of speech used in negotiations are admissible to show 
the conditions existing when the writing was made, the application of the words, 
and the meaning or meanings of the parties. Even though words seem on their 
face to have only a single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when the 
circumstances are disclosed. 
Id. at § 214 comment b. 
139. The V.C.C. comment provides: 
1. This secion definitely rejects: 
(a) Any assumption that because a writing has been worked out which is final 
on some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters agreed upon; 
(b) The premise that the language used has the meaning attributable to such 
language by rules of construction existing in the law rather than the meaning 
which arises out of the commerical context in which it was used; and 
(c) The requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of the type 
of evidence specified in paragraph (a) is an original determination by the court 
that language used is ambiguous. 
U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 1 (1977) (emphasis added). 
140. F.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 78 at 506-07. 
141. 3 A.L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 542 at 111 (1960). 
